Abstract. Network coding is known to provide improved resilience to packet loss and increased throughput. Unlike traditional routing techniques, it allows network nodes to perform transformations on packets they receive before transmitting them. For this reason, packets cannot be authenticated using ordinary digital signatures, which makes it difficult to hedge against pollution attacks, where malicious nodes inject bogus packets in the network. To address this problem, recent works introduced signature schemes allowing to sign linear subspaces (namely, verification can be made w.r.t. any vector of that subspace) and which are well-suited to the network coding scenario. Currently known network coding signatures in the standard model are not homomorphic in that the signer is forced to sign all vectors of a given subspace at once. This paper describes the first homomorphic network coding signatures in the standard model: the security proof does not use random oracles and, at the same time, the scheme allows signing individual vectors on-the-fly and has constant per-packet overhead in terms of signature size. The construction is based on the dual encryption technique introduced by Waters (Crypto'09) to prove the security of hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes.
Introduction
Network coding [1, 18] is an attractive paradigm that offers an interesting alternative to traditional routing mechanisms. Instead of merely storing and forwarding packets in transit, intermediate nodes are allowed to modify them: typically, at each node, outgoing packets contain vectors that are calculated as linear combinations of vectors conveyed by incoming packets. In random linear network coding, packets are combined using coefficients which each node chooses at random, independently of its neighbors. Still, receiving nodes are able to recover upon the speed of network coding public key signatures and designed message authentication codes with homomorphic properties. Assuming that a bounded number of verifiers may collude, they also showed how intermediate nodes can verify the integrity of network-coded data. More recently, Li et al. [19] gave a MAC-based approach supporting in-network verification and resisting an arbitrary number of collusions.
Our Contribution. To the best of our knowledge, in the public key setting, known homomorphic network coding signatures [7, 12] all rely on random oracles in their security proof. Indeed, existing NCS schemes in the standard model (i.e., the second scheme of [7] and the multi-source system in [3] ) can only be used to sign all the base vectors of a subspace at once. This requires the source to be aware of the entire file before sending the first packet.
This paper describes the first homomorphic NCS scheme with a security proof outside the random oracle methodology. Our construction is based on the dual encryption paradigm, introduced by Waters [24] and developed in [17] , the purpose of which was initially to build fully secure (hierarchical) identity-based encryption [22, 6] schemes. We pinpoint an intuitive connection between NCS schemes and the spatial encryption primitive of Boneh and Hamburg [8] , where the receiver's ability to decrypt is made contingent on his knowledge of a private key for a subspace containing the vector assigned to the ciphertext. We explain that such a scheme can be turned into a (not necessarily homomorphic) NCS scheme when the file identifier can be suitably tied up to the signed subspace. The homomorphic property is then achieved by carefully re-using the signer's random coins across all vectors of the same linear subspace: by deriving these coins from the file identifier using a pseudorandom function, the signer can start transmitting packets before the file to be sent is completely known.
In order to prove security in the sense of the definition of Boneh et al. [7] , we use groups of composite order and apply the technique of Lewko and Waters [17] in the context of signatures. One difficulty to deal with is that, unlike previous homomorphic NCS schemes [7, 12] , the system uses a randomized signing algorithm and signatures on distinct vectors must be generated using partially identical randomness in order to be linearly combinable. We thus have to take special precautions to prevent malicious nodes from re-randomizing signatures and wrongly accuse the signer of flooding the network with signatures that cannot be combined.
Since we work in groups of composite order N , vector coordinates and network coefficients must be chosen in a ring Z N instead of a prime field as in [7] . Nevertheless, the scheme has counterparts in prime order groups. While Freeman's framework [11] does not seem to apply (given that it does not apply to the Lewko-Waters techniques [17] , as mentioned in [11] ) to generically transform the scheme into an instantiation in prime-order groups, the system can be adapted in asymmetric pairing-friendly groups of prime order in the same way as the Lewko-Waters IBE [17] . It is also translatable in groups with symmetric pairings using the techniques of [24] . In the paper, we chose to describe it in composite order groups for simplicity.
Organization. In the following, we first review the notion of network coding signatures in section 2. Our homomorphic scheme and its proof are detailed in sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
Background and Definitions

Network Coding
This section briefly recalls the idea of linear network coding. Consider a network with one source node and a subset of nodes called "target nodes". The purpose is to have the source transmit a file to all target nodes, where a file is represented as a matrix containing the m row vectors v 1 , . . . , v m ∈ Z k N over a ring or a field Z N . The source node first creates m augmented vectors w 1 , . . . , w m ∈ Z n N , with n = k + m, by setting
The source then sends these augmented vectors to its neighbor nodes. We notice that the span of row vectors of the above matrix will generate a vector subspace V ⊂ Z n N of dimension m with the basis w 1 , . . . , w m . As defined in [7] , when the basis is in the above form (in the right-hand side of Equation (1)), it is called a properly augmented basis.
Each honest intermediate node in the network processes the incoming packets as follows. Upon receiving vectors y 1 , . . . , y ∈ Z n N on its incoming edges, it computes a new vector for each outgoing edge as a linear combination of the vectors it received. Namely, at the j th outgoing edge, the vector z j ∈ Z n N will have the form z j = i=1 α i,j y i , for some (typically random) coefficients (α 1,j , . . . , α ,j ) ∈ Z N .
A target node will recover the file using a set of vectors from its incoming edges. This can be done if they consist of m vectors { y i = (
where u 1 , . . . , u m are linearly independent (here,
which is computable thanks to to the linear independence of u 1 , . . . , u m .
Definitions
We first recall the definition of network coding signatures from [7] . Definition 1. A network coding signature (NCS) scheme consists of a triple of efficient algorithms Σ = (Keygen, Sign, Verify) with the following specifications.
Keygen(λ, n): is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer n ∈ poly(λ) denoting the length of vectors to be signed. It outputs a positive integer N ∈ N, a public key pk, the corresponding private key sk and the description of an efficiently samplable file identifier space I. Sign(sk, id, V ): is a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm that takes as input a private key sk, a file identifier id ∈ I and a vector subspace V (described as a set of linearly independent vectors v 1 , . . . , v m ∈ Z n N ) of dimension m < n. It outputs a signature σ. Verify(pk, id, y, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a file identifier id ∈ I, a vector y and a signature σ. It outputs 1 or 0.
Correctness requires that, for all λ ∈ N, all integers n ∈ poly(λ) and all triples (pk, sk, I) ← Keygen(λ, n), it holds that for all id ∈ I and all vector subspace
In what follows, we define homomorphic network coding signature schemes. Unlike previous homomorphic schemes [7, 12] , the construction in this paper uses a probabilistic signing algorithm. To make it possible to publicly combine signatures on distinct vectors from the same file, the signer has to re-use part of his random coins to sign all vectors of the subspace. As long as these signatures are generated using the appropriate coins, network nodes can always combine them. However, attention must be paid to the fact that anyone can attempt to re-randomize signatures so as to prevent them from being combinable later on and disrupt the system. For this reason, network nodes have to make sure that valid signatures of vectors from the same file were produced using compatible randomness before combining them. We thus slightly modify the specification of homomorphic NCS schemes [7] and add a compatibility-checking algorithm that allows testing whether signatures are indeed combinable. Definition 2. A homomorphic network coding signature scheme is a tuple of efficient algorithms Σ = (Keygen, Sign, CompatibilityCheck, Combine, Verify) Keygen(λ, n): is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer n ∈ poly(λ) denoting the length of vectors to be signed. It outputs a key pair (pk, sk) and the description of a file identifier space I. Sign(sk, id, v): is a possibly randomized algorithm that takes in a private key sk, a file identifier id ∈ I and a vector v. It outputs a signature σ. CompatibilityCheck(pk, id, {σ i } i=1 ): takes as input a public key pk, a file identifier id and a set of signatures {σ i } i=1 . It outputs 1 if these signatures are deemed compatible for combination and 0 otherwise.
: is a (possibly randomized) algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a file identifier id and tuples (β i , σ i ), each one of which consists of a weight β i and a signature σ i . Intuitively, the output is a signature σ on the vector y = i=1 β i v i , where σ i is a signature on v i .
Verify(pk, id, y, σ): is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a file identifier id ∈ I, a signature σ and a vector y. It outputs 0 or 1.
Correctness is formulated by mandating that, for all security parameters λ ∈ N, all integers n ∈ poly(λ) and all triples (pk, sk, I) ← Keygen(λ, n), the following holds.
1. For all id ∈ I and all n-vectors y, if σ = Sign(sk, id, y), then we necessarily have Verify(pk, id, y, σ) = 1. 2. For all id ∈ I, any > 0 and any set of vectors
For all id ∈ I, any > 0 and any set of triples
In the following, we say that signatures {σ i } i=1 are compatible if they correspond to the same id ∈ I and if it holds that CompatibilityCheck(pk, id,
is a set of compatible signatures, we say that σ is compatible Conversion. We recall how a homomorphic network coding signature allows signing vector subspaces, as noted in [7] . Let scheme Σ 2 = (Keygen 2 , Sign 2 , CompatibilityCheck 2 , Combine 2 , Verify 2 ) be a homomorphic NCS scheme. An ordinary network coding signature Σ 1 = (Keygen 1 , Sign 1 , Verify 1 ) can be obtained as follows.
outputs 1 if and only if
Security. The security definition hereafter slightly generalizes the one of [7] . It requires that it be infeasible to publicly destroy the "combinability" of valid signatures without rendering them invalid when they are considered individually. Our goal is to guarantee that, if valid signatures of several vectors from the same file have incompatible randomness, the signer is necessarily deviating from the specification of the scheme. When such a bogus or misbehaving signer is detected, honest network nodes may simply stop processing their packets.
Definition 3.
A network coding signature scheme Σ = (Keygen, Sign, Verify) is secure if no probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary has non-negligible advantage (as a function of the security parameter λ ∈ N) in the following game:
1. The adversary A chooses an integer n ∈ N and sends it to the challenger who runs Keygen(λ, n) and obtains (pk, sk) before sending pk to A. 2. On polynomially-many occasions, A chooses a linear subspace V i ⊂ Z n N of dimension m i < n. The challenger replies by choosing a file identifier id i ∈ I from the identifier space I and returns id i and σ i = Sign(sk, id i , V i ) to A. 3. A outputs an identifier id , a signature σ and a vector y ∈ Z n N . The adversary A is deemed successful if Verify(pk, id , y , σ ) = 1 and either of the following holds:
• (Class i): id = id i for any i and y = 0.
• (Class ii): id = id i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and the signature σ is not compatible with σ i .
• (Class iii): id = id i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , q} and y ∈ V i .
A's advantage is defined as his probability of victory taken over all coin tosses.
As in [7] , a homomorphic NCS scheme Σ is said to be secure if the network coding signature constructed via the conversion presented above is secure.
Complexity Assumptions
We consider groups (G, G T ) of composite order N = p 1 p 2 p 3 for which a bilinear map e : G × G → G T is computable. In the following, for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we denote by G pi the subgroup of order p i . Also, for all distinct i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we call G pipj the subgroup of order p i p j .
An important property of composite order groups is that pairing two elements of order p i and p j , with i = j, always gives the identity element 1 G T .
In this setting, we rely on the following assumptions introduced in [17] .
, it is infeasible to compute e(g, g) αs .
We note that, while Lewko and Waters rely on the decisional variant of Assumption 3 (according to which e(g, g) αs is indistinguishable from a random element of G T ), its computational counterpart suffices here.
implies digital signatures (according to an observation by Naor reported in [6] ). In spatial encryption, private keys are associated with affine subspaces while ciphertexts correspond to vectors. Decryption is possible when the ciphertext's vector lies in the subspace of the key. By applying Naor's transformation to the spatial encryption scheme of [8] , one readily obtains a sort of selectively secure network coding signature, modulo some twist to bind the file identifier to the subspace which is being signed. By itself, this transformation does not provide the homomorphic property that we are after. To obtain it, we need to start from a specific variant of the NCS scheme derived from the spatial encryption system of [8] and carefully re-use the same randomness to separately sign vectors of the same subspace. Full security (as opposed to selective security [5] ) is obtained using the Lewko-Waters techniques to build (hierarchical) identity-based encryption schemes [17] .
More precisely, the public key comprises the description of bilinear groups
The first two components of each signature form a selectively-secure Boneh-Boyen signature [5] 
r , g r ) on the file identifier id. As implicitly showed in [17] , this signature can be proved fully secure if g, u and h 0 live in the subgroup of order p 1 and if σ 1 , σ 2 are multiplied by a random element of G p3 . This signature (σ 1 , σ 2 ) is then augmented with an element σ 3 = (
N is the vector to be signed. If all the vectors of span( v 1 , . . . , v m ) were signed altogether (by introducing one σ 3 per base vector), signatures would have nearly the same shape as private keys in the spatial encryption scheme of [8] : the only difference is the introduction of a file identifier in σ 1 . Fortunately, base vectors can be signed separately as long as they are signed using the same exponent r. In this case, anyone can publicly compute a signature on any linear combination of v 1 , . . . , v m .
To save the signer from maintaining a state and remember which random exponents were used to sign the vectors of all subspaces, r ∈ Z N can be derived by applying a pseudorandom function to the file identifier id so as to be re-computable later on. We emphasize that the use of a PRF is not meant to de-randomize the scheme in an attempt to obtain unique signatures. The goal is simply to render the signer stateless.
To achieve security in the sense of definition 3, we need to keep signatures from being publicly re-randomizable in their G p1 components. A simple solution is to compute (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as a signature on a hash value of both id and e(g, g)
r , which prevents from altering the underlying r without invalidating the signature. Although this simple trick would not work with Waters signatures [23] (because their security proof would cease to go through), it is compatible with the dual encryption technique [24, 17] which is used to prove security. In addition, anyone can detect if vectors of the same file are signed using different values of r and only the signer can be blamed in such a situation.
Construction
Keygen(λ, n): given a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer n ∈ poly(λ), choose bilinear groups (G,
τ × I → Z N , where τ ∈ poly(λ). The private key is sk := g α , κ while the public key is
and compute a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) as
The algorithm will return 1 if and only if all σ i,2 have the same G p1 component: for i = 2 to , it checks if e(σ 1,2 /σ i,2 , g) = 1 G T and returns 0 otherwise. If all checks succeed, it returns 1. Combine(pk, id, {(β i , σ i )} i=1 ): given pk, a file identifier id and tuples (β i , σ i ),
, and output (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ). Verify(pk, id, y, σ): given a public key pk = g, e(g, g) α , u, {h i } n i=0 , X p3 , a signature σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 3 ) and a vector y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ (Z N ) n , compute id = H(id, e(σ 2 , g)) and return 1 if and only if e(σ 1 , g) = e(g, g)
α · e(u · h id 0 , σ 2 ) and e(σ 3 , g) = e(σ 2 , h
Verifying the correctness of the scheme is straightforward since pairing an element of G p1 with an element of G p3 always gives the identity element in G T .
Efficiency. Signatures only consist of 3 group elements. Without optimizations, verifying individual signatures entails to compute four pairings. However, when multiple signatures must be checked before being combined, a constant number of pairing evaluations suffices when randomized batch verification techniques are used.
Indeed, when network nodes process signatures {(σ i,1 , σ i,2 , σ i,3 )} i=1 from the same file identified by id ∈ I, they can first check that all {σ i,2 } i=1 have the same G p1 component by testing if e i=2 (σ 1,2 /σ i,2 ) ωi , g = 1 G T for randomly chosen ω 2 , . . . , ω 
When verification fails, recent techniques [21] can be adapted to determine which signatures are bad and which packets should be filtered.
As in earlier standard model constructions [7, 3] , the public key size is linear in the dimension n of vectors. We leave it as an interesting open problem to avoid this dependency without resorting to random oracles.
Converted Scheme. From the homomorphic network coding signature, one can obtain an ordinary network coding signature via the generic conversion given by Boneh et al. [7] (and recalled in section 2.2). Applying this conversion to our scheme results in the signature of the form {(
. This scheme is redundant and we can reuse the first two elements for all i. Indeed to sign a subspace V where v 1 , . . . , v m is the properly augmented basis, the signing algorithm outputs σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , {σ 3,i } m i=1 ) where
where R 3 , R 3 , R 3,i ∈ R G p3 and we denote a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). In the next section, we will prove the security of this scheme instead of the scheme converted with the generic conversion.
Security Proof
We first give a simple lemma describing the general form of signatures that are accepted by the verification of the proposed NCS scheme (with redundancy cut as mentioned above).
Lemma 1. For any identifier-vector-signature tuple
)), if it holds that Verify(pk, id, y, σ) = 1, then we have
where id = H(id, e(σ 2 , g)), for some r ∈ Z N , Z 1 , Z 2 , Z 3,i ∈ G p2p3 and some
where we write y = y
Proof. Let an id-vector-signature tuple (id, y, σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , {σ 3,i } m i=1 )) be a valid tuple, that is Verify(pk, id, y, σ) = 1. We will prove that σ will have the form of equation (3). First, since the tuple is accepted, we have
where id = H(id, e(σ 2 , g)). Since σ 2 ∈ G, we can write σ 2 = g r Z 2 for some r ∈ Z N and Z 2 ∈ G p2p3 . Equation (5) 
for some β i ∈ Z N . It remains to prove the property of β i . Equation (6) implies that i=1 β i y n−m+i = a, y . If we write β i = a, v i for some v i ∈ Z n N , then the equation (4) is obtained. This concludes the proof. Proof. The proof follows the dual system methodology used in [24, 17] . From Lemma 1, any valid identifier-vector-signature triple (id, y, σ) will have the following generic form:
where id = H(id, e(σ 2 , g)), for some r ∈ Z N , w 1 , w 2 , w 3,i ∈ Z N , some group elements R 1 , R 2 , R 3,i ∈ G p3 and vectors v 1 , . . . , v m ∈ Z n N which satisfied Eq. (4). We will distinguish two types of signatures as follows.
• Type A: (w 1 , w 2 , w 3,1 , . . . , w 3,n ) = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) mod p 2 .
• Type B: (w 1 , w 2 , w 3,1 , . . . , w 3,n ) = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) mod p 2 .
We will call Type A forgery (resp. Type B forgery) a fake signature of Type A (resp. Type B) which is produced by the forger in the game of definition 3.
The proof considers a sequence of q + 3 games. It starts with the real attack game Game real followed by Game 1 , Game 2 , Game 3 , Game 4.1 , . . . , Game 4.q . In the following we let V (j) be the j-th query where j ∈ {1, . . . , q} and let
) be the answer to the query.
Replacing r with random. This game is identical to as Game real with the difference that the challenger generates all signatures using truly random exponents r R ← Z N (and care is taken to use the same r to sign all vectors of the same subspace) instead of pseudorandom values. Clearly, the security of the PRF implies that Game 1 is computationally indistinguishable from Game real .
Game 2 : Eliminating collisions. It is as Game 1 but the game will abort if there exists an index j ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that id = H(id , e(σ 2 , g)) = H(id j , e(σ
2 , g)) = id j but it holds that either id = id j or id = id j but e(σ 2 , g) = e(σ (j) 2 , g). It is straightforward that, assuming the collisionresistance of H, the difference between Game 1 and Game 2 is negligible. Game 3 : Restriction modulo p 2 . It is as Game 2 but the game will further abort if either of the following event occurs.
-Adversary A outputs a class-(i) forgery (i.e., id = id j for any j and y = 0) or a class-(ii) forgery (i.e., for which id = id j for some j and e(σ 2 , g) = e(σ 2,j , g)) but id = id j mod p 2 (even if id = id j ) for some index j ∈ {1, . . . , q}. -Adversary A outputs a class-(iii) forgery (i.e., id = id j for some j and y ∈ V j ) but for which y mod p 2 ∈ V j mod p 2 . Here, we denote by V mod p 2 the subspace V reduced in Z n p2 . More precisely, for any subspace
. Lemma 2 shows that, under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the difference between Game 2 and Game 3 is negligible. Then, Lemma 3 shows that, if A can output a Type B forgery in Game 3 , Assumption 1 is false. Game 4.0 : Simplification. This is a reformulation of Game 3 for ease of reading.
The game will accept only the following forgery. (Otherwise, it will abort).
-Adversary A outputs a forgery with id = id j mod p 2 for any j and y = 0. -Adversary A outputs a forgery for which id = id j , for some j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, and y mod p 2 ∈ V j mod p 2 . We note that in this game, as in Game real , A is only given Type A signatures. Game 4.k (1 ≤ k ≤ q): Hybrid types. It is as Game 0 but the adversary obtains Type B signatures at the first k signing queries whereas the challenger answers the remaining q − k signing queries by returning Type A signatures. Lemma 4 shows that, if the adversary has noticeably higher probability to output a Type A forgery in Game 4.(k+1) than in Game 4.k , there must be a breach in Assumption 2. Game 4.q : All type B. The forger A only obtains Type B signatures and it becomes easy to prove that any Type A forgery allows breaking Assumption 3, as shown by Lemma 5.
Denote negl as a negligible function in λ.
be the probability that the adversary successfully outputs a forgery in game i of either type, type A, and type B respectively. We then have that |W real − W 3 | ≤ negl guaranteed by the security of PRF, collision-resistance hash, and Lemma 2. Also W Proof. The two games are identical unless the adversary A outputs a forgery involving a pair (id , y ) such that either: (1) id = id j mod p 2 whereas we have id = id j mod N for some j ∈ {1, . . . , q}; (2) there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , q} such that id = id j mod N but det(M ) = 0 mod p 2 and det(M ) = 0 mod N , where M ∈ Z n×n N is the matrix
with m j = dim(V j ) < n, such that R n×(n−mj −1) is a n × (n − m j − 1) matrix whose columns are orthogonal to span( v j,1 , . . . , v j,mj , y ) (such a matrix can be obtained via the Gram-Schmidt process). The matrix has the desired properties since y mod p 2 ∈ V mod p 2 although y ∈ V . The simulator B can extract a non-trivial factor of N by computing gcd(id − id j , N ) in case (1) or gcd(det(M ), N ) in case (2) . As shown in [17] [ Lemma 5] , this allows breaking either Assumption 1 or Assumption 2 depending on which factor is extracted.
Proof. We show that, if the adversary outputs a Type B forgery in Game 3 , there is an algorithm B that, given (g, X 3 , T ), decides if T ∈ R G p1 or T ∈ R G p1p2 .
The distinguisher B sets up the public key pk as e(g, g)
ai for i = 0 to n. Denote a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ). It answers all private key queries according to the specification of the signing algorithm since it knows the private key.
At the end, A outputs a file identifier id , a Type-B signature (
) and a vector y . The algorithm B then computes
The G p1 components of these terms are necessarily canceled out due to equations (3)- (4) . Recall that a Type-B signature is in the generic form (7) with (w 1 , w 2 , w 3,1 , . . . , w 3,n ) = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0) mod p 2 . For this reason, the G p2 components in η 1 , η 2 will be g w1−w2(b+a0id ) 2
and g m i=1 w3,iyn−m+i−w2 a, y 2 , respectively. Hence, as long as b, a 0 , a mod p 2 are information theoretically hidden to the adversary, there must be an element of G p2p3 with non-trivial G p2 component among η 1 , η 2 . But this is true since b, a 0 , a mod p 2 is uncorrelated to b, a 0 , a mod p 1 , which is the only information available from the public key. Therefore, our distinguisher B can conclude that T ∈ G p1p2 if and only if either e(T, η 1 ) = 1 G T or e(T, η 2 ) = 1 G T . Proof. Let us assume that a forger A has significantly better probability of outputting a Type A forgery in Game 4.(k+1) than in Game 4.k . We outline a distinguisher B that breaks Assumption 2 with non-negligible advantage.
Algorithm B takes as input (g, X 1 X 2 , Z 3 , Y 2 Y 3 , T ) and uses its interaction with A to decide if T ∈ G or T ∈ G p1p3 . Recall that A must obtain Type B signatures at her first k signing queries and Type A signatures at the last q − k − 1 queries. We will simulate the interaction so that the k th -query will be a Type A signature (hence Game 4.k ) if T ∈ G p1p3 and a Type B signature (hence Game 4.(k+1) ) if T ∈ G. We then show that the distinguisher B can indeed distinguish whether A's forgery will be of Type A or Type B with overwhelming probability.
To this end, B prepares the public key pk by choosing α, b
to n, and setting u = g b , h i = g ai for i = 0 to n. The public key pk = {g, e(g, g)
α , u, h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n , Z 3 } is given to A. Then, B answers A's queries depending on the index j ∈ {1, . . . , q} of the query. e(g, g) r ). It finally computes a Type-B signature (
[Case j > k] In this case, A simply computes a Type A signature using the private key g α as specified by the signing algorithm (except that, as in Game 1 , r is chosen at random in Z N rather than as a pseudorandom value).
[Case j = k] To answer the k th private key query
. It uses its input T to compute a hash value id j = H(id j , e(T, g)). It finally computes the signature (
It is easy to observe that, in the situation where T ∈ R G, if we let g x 2 be the G p2 component of T for some x ∈ Z * p2 , we obtain a Type B signature where w 1 = x(b + a 0 id j ) mod p 2 , w 2 = x mod p 2 , and w 3,i = x( a, v (j) ) mod p 2 for i = 1 to m. In contrast, if T ∈ R G p1p3 , the above forms a Type A signature.
At the end of the game, A outputs a forgery σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 , {σ 3,i } m i=1 ) and a vector y and a file identifier id such that the property stated in the Game 0 holds. That is either -a forgery with id = id j mod p 2 for any j and y = 0.
-a forgery with id = id j for some j and y mod p 2 ∈ V (j) mod p 2 .
At this stage, B halts and checks whether the forgery is of Type A or B. If the forgery is of Type A, it returns 0 (meaning that T ∈ R G p1p3 ). If the forgery is believed to be of Type B, B rather bets on T ∈ R G p1p2p3 and outputs 1. In order to decide which kind of forgery A comes up with, B uses the input value X 1 X 2 as follows. The algorithm B computes id = H(id , e(σ 2 , g)) and
The G p1 component of each term is canceled out due to equations (3)- (4). If e(X 1 X 2 , η 1 ) = 1 and e(X 1 X 2 , η 2 ) = 1, then the algorithm B deduces that σ is of Type A. Otherwise, it is seen as a Type B signature. To see why this test works with overwhelming probability, we note that, since σ properly verifies, it must be of the form of equations (7)- (8) with (w 1 , w 2 , w 3,1 , . . . , w 3,m ) so that we have e(X 1 X 2 , η 1 ) = e(X 2 , g 2 ) w 1 −w 2 (b+a0id ) , e(X 1 X 2 , η 2 ) = e(X 2 , g 2 ) 
We show that this occurs with negligible probability as follows.
-If the forgery is of the first class, that is id = id j for any j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, then b + a 0 id mod p 2 is independent of A's view which consists only of b + a 0 id k mod p 2 . Therefore equation (9) occurs with negligible probability. -If the forgery is of the second class, that is y mod p 2 ∈ V (j) mod p 2 for any j, then a, y mod p 2 is independent of A's view and (10) can only be verified with negligible chance. Indeed, let us consider what A knows in the information theoretic sense about the values (a 1 , . . . , a n ) taken modulo p 2 . 3,i . Since y mod p 2 ∈ V (k) mod p 2 , y is not in the row space of the above matrix. Since m < n, a, y mod p 2 is independent of A's view.
Lemma 5. Any PPT algorithm A outputting a Type A forgery in Game 4.q allows breaking Assumption 3.
Proof. We outline an algorithm B that takes as input g, g α X 2 , X 3 , g s Y 2 , Z 2 and aims at computing T = e(g, g)
αs using its interaction with A. To this end, B generates the public key pk = g, e(g, g) α , u, {h i } i=0,...,n , X p3 by choosing b, a 0 , . . . , a n R ← Z N and setting X p3 = X 3 , e(g, g) α = e(g α X 2 , g) as well as u = g b and h i = g ai for i = 0 to n. When the forger A makes a private key query V (j) = span( v r ) ∈ Z N and computes 
where the second equality is due to lemma 1 (Z 1 , Z 2 ∈ G p2p3 ). Since σ is a Type A signature, σ 1 , σ 2 have no G p2 component. Hence, the component Y 2 is canceled out in the pairing computation, which explains why T = e(g, g) sα is obtained in the rightmost equality of (11) . To conclude, in Game 4.q , A's advantage is thus negligible if Assumption 3 holds.
